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God, Man, and Law: Of Rights and
Responsibilities*

I tell you the truth .... From the days of John the Baptist until now,
the kingdom of heaven has been forcefully advancing,andforceful men lay
hold of it.'
INTRODUCTION

For thousands of years the kingdom of heaven has been advancing
while strong men, women and children take hold of it. Recently however,
due to a series of overly expansive interpretations of the United States
Constitution's Establishment Clause, the courts have developed a peculiar
bias against religion in the name of avoiding governmental establishment
of religion. What originated in Jefferson's words as a "wall of separation
between church and State," 2 has been reconstructed judicially to resemble
an "altar," rather than the original "wall." The misinterpretation reached its
apogee as the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit struck down the
Cleveland, Ohio school voucher program due to violations of the
Unfortunately for the mostly minority students
Establishment Clause.
from low-income families who live in areas of failing public schools, this
"altar/wall" is used to sacrifice their dreams and aspirations of receiving a
quality private school education.4
Did Jefferson's "wall," designed to prevent the establishment of a
national religion, transform judicially into a type of established religion?
Or have recent Supreme Court decisions signaled a return to properly
balancing the religion clauses? This comment examines the evolving
construction, modifications and improvements made to the "wall of
separation between church and state." Part I presents an analysis of the
unifying religious themes of individual responsibilities, which underlie our
rights, as a reason why religion is important, even in schools. Part II

Special thanks to the Almighty Being who rules over the universe for
*
inspiration, and to the many helpers who contributed their efforts to edit and revise this
comment.
1. Matthew 11:11-12 (New Int'l Version).
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145,164 (1878) (quoting Thomas Jefferson's
2.
letter to the Danbury Baptist Association at 8 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 113 (H.
Washington ed., 1861)).
Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 234 F.3d 945 (6th Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 70
3.
(U.S. Sept. 25, 2001) (No. 00-1751).
3035
U.S.L.W.
Id.
4.
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reviews the historical origins and early development of the Establishment
and Free Exercise Clauses. Part III examines modem Establishment Clause
jurisprudence. Part IV examines the Cleveland, Ohio elementary school
voucher program, applying current Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
The conclusion then recommends embracing anew the dynamic role of
religion in United States history, and suggests renewed focus on the
responsibilities that underlie individual rights.
I. RESPONSIBILITY INHERENT IN WORLD RELIGIONS LEADS To RIGHTS

A. RESPONSIBILITY IS A UNIFYING CHARACTERISTIC AMONG WORLD
RELIGIONS

Responsibility, as defined by Webster, is the "quality or state of being

responsible: as ...moral, legal or mental accountability." 5 The concept of
accountability and responsibility underlie any civilized society. Without a
sense of civic duty displayed by the populace, society could drift toward
anarchy. As such, responsibility has always been the cornerstone of
civilized society throughout the years. Whether coincidentally or not, the
major religions of the world similarly have a common characteristic of
responsibility. Adherents generally have certain responsibilities or duties, a
sense of something that either should or should not be done. For example,
the Judeo-Christian law is founded on the Ten Commandments, regarding
behaviors that the adherent either shall or shall not do.6
The basic religious essence of respect for others, and the sense of
responsibility inherent to Judeo-Christianity's Ten Commandments are
common themes running through the religions of the world. For instance, a
Taoist wise person follows the "subtle path," avoiding direct confrontation
and conflict with others.7 Muslims, through the example of the prophet
Muhammad, have a responsibility to pray five times per day. 8
Prayer
discipline helps develop self-discipline, a useful characteristic for young
people. Buddhists treat others in a respectful manner to develop good

5.
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1935 (3d ed. 1993).
6.
Exodus 20:1-17 (New Int'l Version); Deuteronomy 5:7-21 (New Int'l Version).
7.
See TAO TE CHING, A NEW TRANSLATION BY CH'U TA-KAo 43 (Ch'u Ta-Kao
trans., George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 5th ed. 1959) (1937).
8.
See THE LIFE OF MUHAMMAD 112 (A. Guillaume trans., Oxford Univ. Press
1997) (1955).
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karma, in order to prepare oneself for the afterlife. 9 Shintoists have a
responsibility to live fully each moment of life, making it as worthy as
possible.' ° Hindus practice "Yoga," a regular disciplined course of action
leading to salvation.11 Even a new religion such as Falun Dafa, which
advocates "a combination of moral precepts and physical exercise," is
12
founded on a sense of personal responsibility.
B. RIGHTS FLOW FROM RESPONSIBILITIES

Rights and responsibilities are interdependent correlatives.' 3 In other
vice versa. 14
words, rights for one equals responsibilities for another and
Responsibilities are important because rights and individual freedoms are
collectively grounded upon and rooted therein. For example, when driving
an automobile in the United States one has a right to proceed through an
intersection when the traffic signal light is green. This right is founded
upon the responsibility of other drivers to stop when their light is red, thus
creating freedom for all participants. The concept appears rudimentary,
however drivers in some countries (not wishing to name names but the
Philippines and Dominican Republic come to mind) are free to travel
through any color traffic signal. 15 While it might seem as if individual
freedom is maximized because no driver is burdened by the responsibility
to stop at a red light, anyone who has driven in a country like this, or can
imagine the consequences, will understand that this is not the case. Instead,
the neglect of individual responsibility results in a loss of freedom by all
drivers.
Many other individual freedoms are built upon the foundation of
responsibility. For example, individuals have an inherent right to walk
down the sidewalk unmolested or sleep in peace in their own home. These

See WALPOLA RAHULA, ZEN AND THE TAMING OF THE BULL 50 (1978).
9.
See THE GREAT RELIGIONS OF THE MODERN WORLD 155 (Edward J. Jurji ed.,
10.
1946) ("The gods desire not material gifts, but offerings of uprightness and sincerity.")
(quoting the "Shinto Pentateuch").

11.

See

THE BEGINNINGS OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

37 (Franklin Edgerton trans.,

1965).
Ian Johnson, A Blind Eye: China's Rigid Policies On Religion Helped Falun
12.
Dec. 13, 2000, at Al.
Dafafor Years, WALL ST. J.,
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 511 (3d ed. 1993)
13.
("reciprocally related esp. so that each directly implies the existence of the other, the rights
and duties between shareholders, directors and executives ....).
BARRY NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 20 (1975) ("The law is
14.
made up of rights (and correlative duties)").
Drawn from author's limited, but personal experience.
15.
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rights depend on the responsibilities of others to respect the people and
their privacy. For instance, if someone shoots a bullet from a gun through
the house while they are sleeping or assaults or batters them while walking
down the sidewalk, their freedoms will be lost. There can be no divorce of
rights from responsibilities, but this fact has not been stressed to young
people. As a consequence, in spite of society's focus on individual
freedom, neglect of the responsibilities, upon which freedom is founded,
has resulted in the loss of individual rights.
C. SEPARATION OF RESPONSIBILITIES FROM UNDERLYING RIGHTS IS
UNSTABLE

A narrow focus upon rights without acknowledging the underlying
responsibilities is inherently weak and unstable. The current fashion is to
focus exclusively on individual rights. 16 While there can be no doubt that
this is an important practice for lawyers and others, it ignores the fact that
legal rights grow out of legal responsibilities. For instance, the right to
vote depends upon the voter's responsibility to read and properly mark the
ballot. If need be, the voter may ask the precinct's voting judges for help
voting.' 7 But, unless the voter performs his or her responsibilities, the right
to vote may be lost.
The presidential election of 2000 is a prime example of focusing on
rights rather than responsibilities; where in fact, focus on individual
responsibilities would have secured the right to vote. Certain voters
complained that they could not understand the complicated ballot in Palm
Beach County. 18 A review of the rules mailed to each voter prior to the
election indicates that the voter should have asked for help or requested a
new ballot if necessary.' 9 Some other voters claimed to have been
disenfranchised because they failed to completely perforate the chad; the
square of paper from their ballot failed to completely dislodge from their

16.
E.g., Richard Lacayo, Eye of the Storm; Florida's 25 Electoral Votes Will
Decide the Next President. But FirstComes the Struggle to Decide Who Should Get Them,
TIME, Nov. 20, 2000, at 46 (claiming lost right to vote due to "confusing Palm Beach ballot"
design); see also Fladell v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 772 So. 2d 1240 (Fla.
2000) (seeking declaratory judgment on legality of butterfly ballot that allegedly confused
voters).
17.
See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 101.051 (West 1982 & Supp. 2001) (allowing a voter to
request assistance of two election officials).
18.
Fladell,772 So. 2d at 1242.
19.
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 119 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (noting
that "[e]ach Florida precinct before election day provides instructions on how properly to
cast a vote."); see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 101.46 (West 1982).
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ballot. 20 But, posted inside each polling place were instructions to check
the ballot after voting to ensure that the chad had been completely
removed. 2' Thus, voters could have guaranteed their constitutional right to
controversy by adequate attention to their own
vote and minimized
22
responsibilities.
Even the People's Republic of China, although not widely known for
blazing a trail of legal development regarding human rights, recognizes the
23
and responsibilities.
between rights
relationship
fundamental
Nevertheless, some Americans might like to challenge the correlation
between rights and responsibilities, and thus progress beyond these
fundamental limitations. For example, a lawsuit has been filed to enjoin
the state of Florida from conspicuously posting ten voter's rights and
responsibilities in polling places during Florida elections. 24 The problem is
not the list of voter's rights, including the right to a replacement ballot if a
mistake has been made. Rather, the problem stems from the list of ten
voter responsibilities beginning with, "[e]ach registered voter has the
responsibility to . . ,25 Among these responsibilities causing the most
controversy is the voter's responsibility to "[s]tudy and know the
candidates and issues. 26 Granted, there has been a long and ignominious
history of Jim Crow laws in the United States, designed to prevent some
Nevertheless, to completely forsake voter
citizens from voting.27
'responsibility is to throw the baby out with the bath water; oftentimes the
right to vote may be lost-as well. To completely abandon the concept of
responsibility underlying civil rights leaves voters in the same

20. ' See Bush, 531 U.S. at 101-102. Vice President Gore requested manual ballot
recounts to prevent 'undercounted' votes where the voter failed to completely dislodge the
chad, chip of paper, completely from the ballot card, but merely dimpled, or impregnated it.

Id.

Bush, 531 U.S. at 119 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (instructing voters,
21.
"AFTER VOTING, CHECK YOUR BALLOT CARD TO BE SURE YOUR VOTING
SELECTIONS ARE CLEARLY AND CLEANLY PUNCHED AND THERE ARE NO
CHIPS LEFT HANGING ON THE BACK OF THE CARD") (alteration in original)
(quoting Brief for Respondent Harris et al. at 15 n. 12).
U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
22.
23.
INTRODUCTION TO CHINESE LAW 69 (Wang Chenguang & Zhang Xianchu eds.,
1997) ("In theory as well as in practice, rights coexist with duties. No one enjoys rights and
freedom without assuming corresponding duties.").
See Tom Lyons, State Shouldn't Muddle Voting Rights and 'Responsibilities,'
24.
SARAsOTA HERALD-TRIB. Aug. 23, 2001, at BS1 (discussing suit by Florida Equal Voting
Rights Project to enjoin posting of Voter's Rights and Responsibilities in Florida polling
places).
25. Id.
26. Id.
Id.
27.
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unsatisfactory situation witnessed in the presidential election of 2000.
Voters are not sufficiently informed regarding the responsibility underlying
their right to vote. Voters need to be reminded that they are ultimately
responsible for their vote's accuracy.28
D. RESPONSIBILITIES LEAD TO FREEDOM

The law is generally considered restrictive because it ought to be
obeyed upon fear of punishment. 29 Lost in the obedience is the actual
liberation and freedom created by law.
John Cardinal O'Connor
recognized this relationship in a sermon in honor of the New York City
police department.3 °
Law does not restrict merely. It does that, but law also
liberates ....
So, for example, I am told by the Divine
Commandment, "You shall not steal." That restricts me,
but it frees all of you. You do not have to worry about
your property if I keep the commandment. "You shall not
bear false witness against your neighbor." This restricts
me to tell the truth, not to lie about anyone. But it frees
you knowing that there will be no lies told about you, no
problems created for you by false witness. "You shall not
covet your neighbor's wife." This restricts the individual,
wife or husband, but lets others walk in freedom. "You
shall not kill." This restricts me; I may not kill anyone.
But what freedom it gives to others, how it liberates others!
"Honor your father and your mother." What respect this is
intended to generate for all lawful authority which truly
frees us.31
The Divine Commandments have been distilled down into two
principles: (1) love God and (2) love each other.32 The divine law has been

28.
See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 119 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
29.
John Cardinal O'Connor, You Have Made A Covenant With God And With The
People Of New York, 38 CATH. LAW. 67, 70 (1998).
30.
Id.
31.
Id. (citations omitted).
32.
Mark 12:30-31 (New Int'l Version) ("Love the Lord your God with all your
heart and with all your soul and with all your mind and with all your strength. The second is
this: 'Love your neighbor as yourself.' There is no commandment greater than these."); see
also Leviticus 19:18, Deuteronomy 6:4-5. ,
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33
given so that mankind might be free and live in peace with one another.
Countless people have discovered this secret to happiness and the great joy
available to those upon this earth.34 The drafters of the First Amendment
recognized the important place religion holds in society.
As a
consequence, they sought to secure the rights of conscience, and a free
exercise of the rights of religion through the Free Exercise Clause.35

II. HISTORICAL ORIGIN AND EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF RELIGION
CLAUSES

A. THE ROLE OF RELIGION IN AMERICAN HISTORY
Religion was considered a necessary element of education even before
the First Amendment.3 6
"Religion, morality, and knowledge being
necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and
the means of education shall forever be encouraged."3 7 The Court
concluded that "[flew concepts are more deeply embedded in the fabric of
our national life, beginning with pre-Revolutionary times, than for the
government to exercise at the very least this kind of benevolent neutrality
toward churches and religious exercise generally ....
There are also many symbols of religion's role in American history.
For example, the Liberty Bell, commissioned in 1751 to hang in
Pennsylvania's State House, displays a rich religious heritage.39 It bears a
biblical quotation: "Proclaim liberty throughout all the land unto all the
inhabitants thereof.''4

33.
Ezekiel 18:27 ("[I]f a wicked man turns away from the wickedness he has
committed and does what is just and right, he will save his life.").
34.
John 15:11 ("[Y]our joy may be complete.").
35.
U.S. CONST. amend. I; see infra Part II.B.
36.
See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 443 n.9 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring).
37.
Northwest Ordinance, art. III, 1 Stat. 50 (1789). The Northwest Ordinance was
originally enacted by the Continental Congress in 1787 and then re-enacted in 1789 by the
first Congress of the United States. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 100 (1985)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
38.
Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 676-77 (1970).
39.
7 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 332 (15th ed.1994).
40.
Id. (quoting Leviticus 25:10).
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Another example of religion's role in our heritage is the "Star
Spangled Banner," adopted as our National Anthem in 1931.41 The fourth
stanza reads:
0, thus it be ever when freemen shall stand
Between their lov'd homes and the war's desolation!
Blest with vict'ry and peace, may the heav'n rescued land
Praise the Pow'r that hath made and preserved us a nation!
Then conquer we must, when our cause it is just,
And this be our motto--"In God is our Trust."
And the Star-Spangled Banner in triumph shall wave
O'er the land of the free and the home of the brave.42
Not only do American symbols acknowledge the role played by
providence in the development of the United States, United States
Presidents have as well. George Washington began the American tradition
of gratitude and thanksgiving to an "Almighty Being" in his first inaugural
address.43 Since then "[e]ach of our Presidents ...has upon assuming his
Office asked for the protection and help of God."" George Washington
began the tradition when he implored:
[F]ervent supplications to that Almighty Being who rules
over the universe, who presides in the councils of nations,
and whose providential aids can supply every human
defect, that His benediction may consecrate to the liberties
and happiness of the people of the United States a
Government instituted by themselves for these essential
purposes . . . . In tendering this homage to the Great
Author of every public and private good, I assure myself
that it express your sentiments not less than my own, nor
those of my fellow-citizens at large less than either. No
people can be bound to acknowledge and adore the

41.
Engel, 370 U.S. at 449 (Stewart J.,dissenting); 36 U.S.C. § 301 (1999)
(originally enacted as Act of March 3, 1931, ch. 436, 46 Stat. 1508), available at
http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/treasures/images/uc05112x.jpg. (last visited Oct. 28, 2001).
42.
Engel, 370 U.S. at 440 n.5 (Douglas, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
43. Engel, 370 U.S. at 446 n.3 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 446 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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Invisible Hand which conducts
the affairs of men more
45
than those of the United States.
President Lincoln continued the American religious tradition in his
second inaugural address of March 4, 1865, when he said:
Fondly do we hope, fervently do we pray, that this mighty
scourge of war may speedily pass away. Yet, if God wills
that it continue until all the wealth piled by the bondsman's
two hundred and fifty years of unrequited toil shall be
sunk, and until every drop of blood drawn with the lash
shall be paid by another drawn with the sword, as was said
three thousand years ago, so still it must be said "the
judgments of the Lord are true and righteous altogether."
With malice toward none, with charity for all, with
firmness in the right as God gives us to see the right, let us
strive on to finish the work we are in, to bind up the
nation's wounds, to care for him who shall have borne the
battle and for his widow and his orphan, to do all which
may. achieve and cherish a just and lasting peace among
ourselves and with all nations.46
Countless similar examples could be listed, but there is no need to
belabor the obvious. Since the Constitution permits Presidents to join in
prayer, and since those Presidents have acknowledged the existence of an
"Invisible Hand which conducts the affairs of men," school children should
be free to experience the tradition as well.47
B. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF FIRST AMENDMENT

Before ratification of the Constitution there had been a history of
government established and supported religions, both in England and
America. 48 "[T]he inevitable result had been that it had incurred the hatred,
disrespect and even contempt of those who held contrary beliefs. ' 4 9 James
Madison, one of the principal drafters of the First Amendment, spoke

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 446 n.3 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Id. at 448 n.3 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Id. at 446 n.3 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
Engel, 370 U.S. at 431.
Id.
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against established religion in his Memorial and Remonstrance Against
Religious Assessments.5 ° He noted some of the problems that developed in
an established church:
[E]xperience witnesseth that ecclesiastical establishments,
instead of maintaining the purity and efficacy of Religion,
have had a contrary operation. During almost fifteen
centuries, has the legal establishment of Christianity been
on trial. What have been its fruits? More or less in all
places, pride and indolence in the Clergy; ignorance and
servility in the laity; in both, superstition, bigotry and
persecution. Enquire of the Teachers of Christianity for the
ages in which it appeared in its greatest lustre; those of
to the ages prior to its incorporation with
every sect, point
51
Civil policy.
For example, only a few years after King Edward VI established the
Book of Common Prayer, it became the only accepted form of religious
services in the Church of England. 52 "[A]n Act of Uniformity was passed
to compel all Englishmen to attend those services and to make it a criminal
offense to conduct or attend religious meetings of any other kind."53 The
law was consistently flouted by dissenting religious groups and contributed
to widespread persecutions. 4
It was against this backdrop of systematic religious persecution that
the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment were drafted. Rhode Island
and North Carolina flatly refused to ratify the Constitution in absence of
amendments in the nature of a Bill of Rights.56

Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 97 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Walz v.
50.
Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 720 (1970) (Douglas J., dissenting) (quoting 2 THE WRITINGS
OF JAMES MADISON 183-91 (G. Hunt ed., 1901)) ("Before any man can be considered as a
member of Civil Society, he must be considered as a subject of the Governor of the
Universe.").
51.
Engel, 370 U.S. at 431-32 n.13; James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance
Against Religious Assessments (1785), in 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 301 (Robert A.
Rutland et al. eds., 1973).
Engel, 370 U.S. at 432.
52.
Id.
53.
54.
Id. at 432-33 (recounting the persecution and imprisonment of John Bunyan
who had persisted in holding "unlawful [religious] meetings").
55.
See generally Engel, 370 U.S. at 443 (discussing the political atmosphere at the
time the First Amendment was passed).
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 93 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing 1 J.
56.
ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 334 (1891)).
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Virginia and North Carolina proposed identical guarantees
of religious freedom: "[A]ll men have an equal, natural and
unalienable right to the free exercise of religion, according
to the dictates of conscience, and ...
no particular religious
sect or society ought to be favored or established, by law,
in preference to others.""7
James Madison, as one of the leaders of the House, desired to
"extinguish from the bosom of every member of the community, any
apprehensions that there are those among his countrymen who wish to
deprive them of the liberty for which they valiantly fought and honorably
bled. ''58 He proposed language that, "[t]he civil rights of none shall be
abridged on account of religious belief or worship, nor shall any national
religion be established, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be
in any manner, or on any pretext, infringed. 5 9 Madison "apprehended the
meaning of the words to be that Congress should not establish a religion,
and enforce the legal observation of it by law, nor
6 compel men to worship
conscience."
their
to
contrary
manner
any
in
God
But this language generated worries amongst the New England States
where state-established religions were the rule rather than exception.
Representative Benjamin Huntington, who was from Connecticut, stated
the New England States' concern regarding the Committee's language.
[The proposed language might] be taken in such latitude as
to be extremely hurtful to the cause of religion. He
understood the amendment to mean what had been
expressed by the gentleman from Virginia; but others
might find it convenient to put another construction upon it
He hoped that "the amendment would be made in such
....
a way as to secure the rights of conscience, and a free

57.
Wallace, 472
note 56, at 659; 4 ELLIOT,
58.
Wallace, 472
(Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
59.
Wallace, 472
(Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
60.
Wallace, 472
(Joseph Gales ed., 1789).

U.S. at 93 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting 3 ELLIOT, supra
supra note 56, at 244).
U.S. at 94 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 432
U.S. at 94 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); 1 ANNALS

OF

U.S. at 95 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); 1 ANNALS

OF CONG.

CONG. 434
730
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exercise of the rights of religion, but not to patronise (sic)
those who professed no religion at all. 61
Madison responded by including the word "national" before "religion"
to calm the concerns of the New England states.62 The Senate, conducting
its floor debates in secret, made some changes to the Bill of Rights, but the
House refused to accept the Senate's changes.63 Instead, the House
requested a conference and the version that emerged from the conference
eventually found its way into the First Amendment. 64 From these glimpses
of history one can see that Madison ."saw the Amendment as designed to
prohibit the establishment of a national religion, and perhaps to prevent
discrimination among sects. He did not see it as requiring
neutrality on the
' 65
part of government between religion and irreligion.
"The evil to be aimed at, so far as those who spoke were concerned,
appears to have been the establishment of a national church, and perhaps
the preference of one religious sect over another; but it was definitely not
concerned about whether the Government might aid all religions
evenhandedly., 66 According to Justice Brennan in Abington School District
v. Schempp, 67 the First Amendment should be examined in light of what
particular "practices . . . which the Framers deeply feared; whether, in
short, they tend to promote that type of interdependence between religion
and state which the First Amendment was designed to prevent. ' 68 By this
analysis, Justice Rehnquist says, "one would have to say that the First
Amendment Establishment Clause should be read no more broadly than to
prevent the establishment of a national religion
or the governmental
69
preference of one religious sect over another.

61.
Wallace, 472 U.S. at 96 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 730-31
(Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
62.
See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 98 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (explaining Madison's
beliefs in 1789).
63.
Id. at 97.
Id.
64.
65.
Id. at 98.
Id. at 99.
66.
Id. at 99-100 (citing Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 236 (1963)
67.
(Brennan, J., concurring).
68.
Id. at 99-100; (citing Abington, 374 U.S. at 236 (Brennan, J., concurring).
69.
Wallace, 472 U.S. at 99-100 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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C. THE ORIGINS OF THE WALL OF SEPARATION BETWEEN CHURCH AND
STATE

Contrary to popular belief, Thomas Jefferson was not even in the
United States during the proposal, and ratification of the First Amendment.
Instead, he was serving as U.S. minister to France. Consequently, he was
less intimately aware of the discussion and reasoning surrounding the
Religion Clauses. 70 The "wall of separation" traces its origin to a letter
from Thomas Jefferson to the Danbury Baptist Association written in 1802,
thirteen years after the Amendment was passed by Congress. 71 "I
contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American
people which declared that their legislature should 'make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof,' thus
' 72
building a wall of separation between church and State.
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, in its final form, reads:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof ... ,
Chief Justice Burger, writing
for the Court in Walz v. Tax Commission,74 noted that the purpose of the
clauses "was to state an objective, not to write a statute," and that "[t]he
court has struggled to find a neutral course between the two Religion
Clauses, both of which are cast in absolute terms, and either of75which, if
expanded to a logical extreme, would tend to clash with the other.,
While no "bright line" guidance is afforded by the numerous opinions
of the Court, and of Justices in concurrence and dissent in the leading cases
applying the Establishment Clause,76 there has been general agreement
upon the applicable principles and upon the framework of analysis.7 7 The
Court has recognized its inability to perceive with invariable clarity the
"lines of demarcation in this extraordinarily sensitive area of constitutional

70.

Wallace, 472 U.S. at 93 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also DAVID BARTON,
(4th ed. 1991).
71.
See generally Wallace, 472 U.S. at 92-114 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(providing a detailed examination of the historical background and discussions surrounding
enactment and understanding of the religion clauses); see also BARTON, supra note 70, at
44.
72.
Wallace, 472 U.S. at 92 (citing 8 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 113 (H.
Washington ed., 1861).
73.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
74.
397 U.S. 664 (1970).
75.
Id. at 668.
76.
Comm. for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 761
(1973).
77.
See id. (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971)).
THE MYTH OF SEPARATION 44

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITYLAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22-1

law., 78 And where questions of entanglements are involved the Court has
acknowledged that, as of necessity, the "wall" is not without bends and

may constitute a "blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending on all
the circumstances of a particular relationship.

79

D. EARLY ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE

The history of the Establishment Clause has been recounted frequently
in Supreme Court opinions. 80 For many years, the Supreme Court properly
balanced the Free Exercise Clause against the Establishment Clause.81
However, beginning with Everson v. Board of Education,82 the Court's
interpretation became "expressly freighted"8 3with Jefferson's "wall"
metaphor.84 In Everson, the Court approved a program of reimbursements
to parents of public as well as parochial schoolchildren for bus fares paid in
connection with transportation to and from school because bus service was
analogized to police or fire protection made available to all citizens.85
When confronted with dilemmas, the Court has poked holes and
modifications in the "wall of separation" between church and state. For
instance, secular textbooks were authorized for all children in grades seven
through twelve attending public and nonpublic schools.86 Likewise, federal
funds were authorized for the construction of facilities to be used for
clearly secular purposes by public and nonpublic institutions of higher
learning.87 Property tax exemptions for church property were held not to

78.
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
79. Id. at 614.
80.
See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 28 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting);
McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., writing separately);
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Wallace
v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
81.
See BARTON, supra note 70, at 47-82 (citing fifteen Supreme Court cases that
Barton deems representative and reflective of the constitutional intent); see also James E.
M. Craig, Comment, "In God We Trust," Unless We Are A Public Elementary School:
Making A Case For Extending Equal Access to Elementary Education, 36 IDAHO L. REv.
529, 531-37 (2000).
82.
330 U.S. 1(1947).
83.
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 92 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The
Court in Everson stated that, "[t]he First Amendment has erected a wall between church and
state. That wall must be kept high and impregnable." Everson, 330 U.S. at 18.
84.
Everson, 330 U.S. at 16; see also Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164
(1879) (concerning a Mormon's free exercise challenge to a federal polygamy law).
85.
Everson, 330 U.S. at 16.
86.
Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 248 (1968).
87.
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 689 (1971).
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violate the Establishment Clause despite the fact that such exemptions
relieved churches of a financial burden.88 In addition, an indirect and
incidental effect beneficial to religious institutions has never been thought a
sufficient defect to warrant the invalidation of state law. 89 Thus, Sunday
closing laws were sustained even though one of their undeniable effects
was to render it somewhat more likely that citizens would respect religious
institutions, and even attend religious services. 90
There is rare unanimity among the Justices in their recognition that
"religious organizations cannot be isolated from the basic government
functions that create the civil environment." 91 As the Court noted in
Everson, civil services common to all citizens such as police and fire
protection, sewage disposal, highways and sidewalks for parochial schools
are "so separate and so indispensably marked off from the religious
function, that they may fairly be viewed as reflections of a neutral posture
toward religious institutions." 92 Thus, any wall of separation constructed
between church and state is, from the outset, fundamentally riddled with
enough holes that it resembles the construction of Swiss cheese more than
any traditional "wall. 93
E. THE WALL BEGINS TO TAKE THE SHAPE OF AN ALTAR

In Engel v. Vitale,94 the Court put a few more bricks in the wall of
separation as the 'wall' began to take the shape of an 'altar,' i.e. a type of
government established anti-religion. The Court declared unconstitutional
a morning prayer authorized by the New York City Board of Education.95
The prayer stated: "Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon
Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our
Country. ' 96 While acknowledging that "[t]he history of man is inseparable

88.
Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 680 (1970).
Comm. for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 775
89.
(1973).
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 453 (1961).
90.
91.
Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 868 (2000) (Souter, J. dissenting).
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1947).
92.
93.
See generally Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S.
384, 399 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that "[c]onstitutional scholars have criticized
Lemon and bemoaned the strange Establishment Clause geometry of crooked lines and
wavering shapes its intermittent use has produced.").
94.
370 U.S. 421 (1962).
95.
Engel,370 U.S. at 421.
Id.at 422.
96.
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from the history of religion, '97 the Court extended the Establishment
Clause from the true establishment of religion through government
collected tax support to subsume this brief invocation to remain in God's
good graces.98
But, this brief prayer is natural to the history and tradition of the
United States. The Court cites Madison's fears "that the same authority
which can establish Christianity, in the exclusion of all other Religions may
establish with the same ease any particular sect of Christians in exclusion
of all other Sects." 99 However, this prayer must be stretched a long way to
be classified as an establishment of Christianity' j
It is nearly
indistinguishable from the invocation given upon commencement of Court
session, "God save the United States and this Honorable Court."'1° Nor is
Madison's fear of government money used to subsidize religion a prime
issue. When the teachers voluntarily recited this morning prayer, hardly
any more taxpayer money was used for prayer than is used to pay the Court
crier.
Some of the petitioners in Engel profess no religion. 10 1 It appears that
the religious belief espoused by Engel's petitioners, namely a belief in no
religion, has been cleverly established by the Court. In the name of the
Establishment Clause's separation of church and state, a type of religion
has been established, albeit a negative belief. But, religious beliefs should
be acknowledged as a full spectrum of belief.10 2 Thus no religion is itself a
form of religious faith. Furthermore, Justice Douglas stated, "I cannot say
that to authorize this prayer is to establish a religion in the strictly historic
meaning of those words."' 0 3 Nor could he because the Church of England
was the officially established church in England and all others were
suppressed, °4 a far cry from the simple prayer invoked here.

97.
Id. at 434.
98.
Id. at 436.
99.
See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 55 (1985); see also Engel, 370 U.S. at 435
(citing James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in 2
WRITINGS OF MADISON 183, at 185-86 (G. Hunt ed., 1901)).
100.
Engel, 370 U.S. at 439 (Douglas, J., concurring).
101.
Id. at 440.
102.
See Byard Q. Clemmons, In God We Trust, FED. LAW., June 1999, at 33, 36
("There is a crying need for the identification of atheism for what it is, and that is a religion
- albeit a negative one, nevertheless it is religious expression. It is the one extreme of the
end of the spectrum of thought concerning the causation of things.")
103.
Engel, 370 U.S. at 442 (Douglas, J., concurring).
104.
See id. at 442 n.7 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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F. AN EXAMPLE OF THE WALL AS ESTABLISHED RELIGION

A good example of the "wall's" transformation into a type of antireligion is the case of C.H. ex rel. Z.H. v. Oliva.10 5 In Oliva, a
kindergarten teacher in a New Jersey public school asked her students to
make a poster, in the spirit of the Thanksgiving holiday, depicting what
they were "thankful for."'10 6 Five-year-old Zachary Hood, produced a
poster indicating that he was thankful for Jesus.' 0 7 The allegations are that
Zachary's poster, along with those of his classmates, was subsequently
placed on display in the hallway of the school. 0 8 On a day when his
teacher was absent, employees of the school removed Zachary's poster
because of its religious theme.' °9 Upon her return, the teacher properly
poster was placed
returned the poster to the hallway, although this time the
n°
at a less prominent location at the end of said hallway.
The following year, a similar incident occurred while Zachary was in
first grade. As a reward for achieving a certain degree of proficiency in
reading, the teacher, Ms. Oliva, invited students to bring in a book to read
to the class. "The only condition on the selection was that it would be
reviewed first by [the teacher] to insure that its length [and] complexity
were appropriate for the first grade."' Zachary qualified to read a story to
the class and brought to school a book entitled The Beginner's Bible:
Timeless Children's Stories. Zachary wanted to read the following story,
called "A Big Family," which represents an adaptation of the story of the
reconciliation of Jacob and Esau from Genesis 29:1-33:20:
Jacob traveled far away to his uncle's house. He worked
for his uncle taking care of sheep. While he was there,
Jacob got married. He had twelve sons. Jacob's big family
lived on his uncle's land for many years. But Jacob wanted
to go back home. One day, Jacob packed up all his
animals and his family and everything he had. They
traveled all the way back home to where Esau lived. Now
Jacob was afraid that Esau might still be angry at him. So

226 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Hood v. Medford
105.
Township Bd. of Educ., 121 S.Ct. 2519 (2001).
106.
Oliva, 226 F.3d at 201.
107.
Id.
108.
Id.
Id.
109.
Id.
110.
dissenting):
111.
Id. at 203-04 (2000) (Alito, J.,
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he sent presents to Esau. He sent servants who said,
"Please don't be angry anymore." But Esau wasn't angry.
He ran to Jacob. He hugged and kissed him. He was
2
happy to see his brother again."1
Ms. Oliva told Zachary that he could not read this story to the class
"because of its religious content." Instead, she permitted Zachary to read
the story to her in private. Other students, however, were allowed to read
their favorite stories to the class. 1 3 Upon learning of this incident,
Zachary's mother, Carol Hood, spoke with the teacher, who informed her
that Zachary could not read the story to the class "because it might
influence other students." Ms. Hood next spoke with the school principal,
who said that reading the story "was the equivalent of 'praying'."" 4
Noting that she had received complaints in the past, the principal stated that
the story "might upset Muslim, Hindu or Jewish students."'1 5 She added
that there was "no place in the public school for the reading of the Bible"
and advised: "[M]aybe you should consider taking your child out of public
school, since you don't appear to be public school material.""' 6 The
principal noted that "her position was fully supported by various legal
authorities."",17
Ms. Hood, in her individual capacity, and as Zachary's guardian ad
litem, filed a two-count complaint in federal district court. She claimed
that both the poster incident and the story incident violated Zachary's
constitutional right to freedom of expression. The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of the school administrators and teachers
regarding both incidents. '18 An evenly divided panel of the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit en banc affirmed the reading incident without
further explication, in accordance with established traditions." 9 The court
remanded 20the poster incident to allow plaintiffs to amend their
complaint. 1
C.H. ex rel. Z.H. v. Oliva demonstrates how Jefferson's "wall of
separation" has become a type of established anti-religion religion because
young persons are discriminated against when acting contrary to the

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120..

Id. at 204.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
C.H. ex rel. Z.H. v. Oliva, 990 F. Supp. 341, 356 (D.N.J 1997).
C.H. ex rel. Z.H. v. Oliva, 226 F.3d 198, 200 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc).
Id.
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established attitude of anti-religion. Although Zachary may read his story
privately with his teacher, separate but equal treatment in public schools
121
has been found less than equal by the Supreme Court in another context.
The Establishment Clause has expanded, as feared by the authors of the
First Amendment, to "patronize those who profess no religion at all.' 22
Zachary's principal, implicitly applying Justice Kennedy's "coercion"
test, 123 worries that Zachary's story "might upset" other students. 124 The
principal highlights and focuses upon this subtle and attenuated, possibly
imaginary, form of coercion. Meanwhile, the principal overlooks the actual
and real coercion she inflicts upon Zachary to change schools. She
suggests to Zachary's mother that he "[doesn't] appear to be public school
126
material,"' 125 even though he had qualified to read a story of his choice.
In summary, little Zachary received his government instruction on how to
properly genuflect before the established "altar/wall of separation."
Notable for its absence was a claim based on violation of Zachary's
Madison had
First Amendment Free Exercise of Religion rights.
interpreted the Free Exercise Clause to mean, "nor shall the full and equal
i27
rights of conscience be in any manner, or on any pretext, infringed."'
Other discussion concerning the religion clauses also talked about securing
of "conscience"
the "rights of conscience."' 128 Nevertheless, the concept
12 9
appears to have drifted into the court's subconscious.

121.
See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) ("We conclude that in the
field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place.").
122.
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 96 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see supra
text accompanying note 60.
See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592 (1992); see infra Part III.C and text
123.
accompanying notes 170-77.
124.
C.H. ex rel. Z.H. v. Oliva, 226 F.3d 198, 204 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc) (Alito, J.,
dissenting).
125.
Id.
126.
Id. at 203.
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 94 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); (citing 1
127.
ANNALS OF CONG. 434 (Joseph Gates ed., 1789)); see supra note 59.
Wallace, 472 U.S. at 93 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see supra notes 60-61.
128.
129.
The psychological development theory of "conscience" is worth examining at
this juncture, even though beyond the scope of this comment. Perhaps the Court believes
that exercise of conscience is unimportant for young people. Perhaps conscience is
something that magically appears as children reach a certain age, similar to the drinking age,
wherein persons are instantly endowed with the capability to consume alcoholic beverages.
But what if conscience is something that develops from a young age? What if young people
who fail to develop a sense of conscience never learn right from wrong? What if these
young people, when they grow older, do things that society considers wrong, and our young
people become locked up in penitentiaries? Can society afford to ignore the development of
conscience? It might appear that rights of conscience are worth developing at an early age
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III. MODERN ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE

A. THE EARLY LEMON TEST ERA

The Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 130 set the foundation for the current
test of Establishment Clause jurisprudence. In order for a statute to be
constitutional under the Lemon test, "[f]irst, the statute must have a secular
legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that
neither advances nor inhibits religion . . . ; finally, the statute must not
' 131
foster 'an excessive entanglement with religion.'
Discussing application of these "tests," Chief Justice Burger noted in
Tilton v. Richardson that, "there is no single constitutional caliper that can
be used to measure the precise degree" to which any one of them is
applicable to the state action under scrutiny. 32 Rather, these tests or
criteria should be "viewed as guidelines" within which to consider "the
cumulative criteria developed over many years and applying to a wide
range of governmental action challenged as violative of the Establishment
Clause.", 3 3
A fundamental principal, "premised more on experience and history
than logic" is presented in Committee for Public Education and Religious
Liberty v. Nyquist. 1'
Where the state law is genuinely directed at enhancing a
recognized freedom of individuals, even one involving
both secular and religious consequences, . . . the
Establishment Clause no longer has probative effect ....
[T]he experienced judgment of various members of this
Court over the years [demonstrates] that the balance
between the policies of free exercise and establishment of
religion tips in favor of the former when the legislation
moves away from direct aid to religious institutions and
takes on the character of general aid to individual families.
This judgment reflects the caution with which we
scrutinize any effort to give official support to religion and
because otherwise, the costs to society are too high.
130.
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
131.
Id.
132.. 403 U.S. 672, 677 (1971).
133.
Id. at 677-78.
134.
413 U.S. 756, 802 (1973) (Burger, J., dissenting).
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with which we treat general welfare
the tolerance
135
legislation.
The Nyquist majority ruled that state tax deductions to parents of
children in religious schools violated the Lemon test because it had the
"impermissible effect of advancing religion."1 36 Even so, Justice Powell,
writing for the Court in Nyquist, stated:
[T]his Nation's history has not been one of entirely
sanitized separation between Church and State. It has
never been thought either possible or desirable to enforce a
regime of total separation, and as a consequence cases
arising under [the Establishment and Free Excercise]
Clauses have presented some of13 7the most perplexing
questions to come before this Court.
This misconstruction of the "wall of separation" grows until its
culmination in Wallace v. Jaffree,138 where even a moment of silence
designated as an opportunity to meditate or silently pray is categorized as
an endorsement of religion, and therefore an unconstitutional violation of
the Establishment Clause.1 39 This decision was ironic in that a statute
expressly authorizing school children to pray silently during a moment of
silence was struck down as an establishment of religion by a court40which
1
itself had opened its session with an invocation for Divine protection.
The "wall" has developed subtlety by modifications and renovations
into a versatile structure, occasionally acting as a wall, when necessary.
But in certain cases constructed more to resemble an altar upon which
ritual sacrifices are offered to placate the Holy, err - Holey, Wall. It may
seem ironic that the "wall of separation" could itself resemble a
government established and sponsored religion. "But religion is the full
has, in fact,
spectrum of beliefs, to include nonbelief. And the government
' 41
instituted a system whereby disbelief is encouraged.'

Id. (footnotes and citations omitted).
135.
Id.at 794.
136.
Id. at 760.
137.
472 U.S. 38 (1985).
138.
See id.at 61.
139.
Id. at 85-86 (1985) (Burger, J., dissenting) ("God save the United States and
140.
this Honorable Court.").
See Clemmons, supra note 102, at 35.
141.
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Examining the "wall of separation theory," Justice Rehnquist
recognized in his dissent in Wallace v. Jaffree. "It is impossible to build
sound constitutional doctrine upon a mistaken understanding of
constitutional history, but unfortunately the Establishment Clause has been
expressl, freighted with Jefferson's misleading metaphor for nearly forty
years." ' 2 Upon close examination the 'wall of separation' resembles not
the gypsum, tape and plaster of an ordinary wall, but bears closer
resemblance to the design and construction of a piece of Swiss cheese.
Numerous holes have grown into and become a part of the structure.
Justice Jackson recognized as much in McCollum v. Board of Education
that "Jefferson's metaphoric 'wall of separation' between church and state
has become 'as winding as the famous serpentine wall' he designed for the
University of Virginia."' 143 Furthermore, four years later Justice Jackson
would remark, "[t]he wall which the Court was professing to erect between
Church and State has become even more warped and twisted than I had
expected."' 44
B. LATER LEMON TEST CASES SIGNAL A RETURN TO BALANCING RELIGION
CLAUSES

Justice Burger's reasoned dissent from Nyquist gained traction in the
early 1980's. The Court began to focus on the fact that, when the benefit is
given directly to the parent, without regard to the type of school, religious
or nonreligious, to which the parents might choose to send their children, it
145
is a strong indicator of the statute's neutrality.
For instance, in Mueller v. Allen, a statute permitted taxpayers to
deduct from state income tax expenses incurred in sending children to
parochial schools. 146 In Mueller, the Court held that a Minnesota statute
authorizing a tax deduction for certain educational expenses for parents of
students attending either public or private schools, religious or
nonreligious, did not violate the "impermissible effect" prong of the Lemon
test. 47 "The Court focused on the fact that the deduction was given
directly to the parents, without regard to the type of school, religious or

142.
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 92 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
143.
McCullom v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 238 (1948) (Jackson J., concurring).
144.
Zorach v. Caulson, 343 U.S. 306, 325 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
145.
See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 400 (1983) (reasoning that any money
received by a religious school was "ultimately controlled by private choices of individual
parents").
146.
Mueller, 463 U.S. at 391-92.
147.
Mueller, 463 U.S. at 397-400.
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nonreligious, to which the parents might choose to send their children, as a
strong" indicator of the statute's 'neutrality."", 148 Any money received at a
was "ultimately controlled by the private
religious school, the Court said,
1 49
parents.'
individual
choices of
The principle, that if public funds find their way to a religious school
as a result of genuinely private choice then such a choice does not violate
the Establishment Clause, was reasserted in Witters v. Washington
Department of Services for the Blind.150 There, a Washington state
program survived an Establishment Clause challenge even though it
provided vocational rehabilitation assistance for a blind individual to attend
a Christian college in order to study to be a Christian pastor. Funds under
the program were dispersed directly to the eligible applicants who made the
choice of where to expend the educational funds; therefore, "[a]ny aid...
that ultimately flow[ed] to religious institutions [did] so only as15 a result of
1
the genuinely independent and private choices of aid recipients.'
In Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District,52 the Court upheld
of a program providing a sign-language interpreter for
constitutionality
the
a deaf student in a Catholic high school. Relying upon Mueller and
Witters, the Zobrest Court concluded that the statute gave parents the
choice of where to send their eligible children to school and "distributes
or
benefits neutrally . . . without regard to the 'sectarian-nonsectarian,
153
public-nonpublic nature of the institution benefited.""
No case could illustrate more clearly that the law had changed than the
Agostini v. Felton decision in 1997.154 Agostini reexamined and overruled
Aguilar v. Felton,' lifting the permanent injunction that had prevented
public school teachers from entering private schools to provide remedial
In Agostini, the Court began by recasting Lemon's
education.
"entanglement" inquiry as a factor under the "impermissible effect" prong
rather than as a separate and independent criterion. 156 It then identified
three new subcriteria to consider when evaluating whether a governmentaid program violates Lemon 's "impermissible effect" prong. 57 These are:
(1) whether the aid results in governmental indoctrination; (2) whether the

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id.
Mueller, 463 U.S. at 399-400.
474 U.S. 481 (1986).
Witters, 474 U.S. at 488.
509 U.S. 1 (1993).
Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 10 (quoting Witters, 474 U.S. at 487).
521 U.S. 203 (1997).
473 U.S. 402 (1985).
See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 232-34.
See id. at 234.
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aid program defines its recipients by reference to religion; and (3) whether
the aid creates an excessive entanglement between government and
religion. 5 '
Using this modified Lemon test, the Agostini Court held constitutional
a federally mandated New York education program which sent public
school teachers into both private and public schools to provide remedial
education to eligible children.1 59 The Agostini Court concluded that
programs in which money ultimately flows to a private religious school
based on "the genuinely independent and private choice of individuals" do
60
not violate the Establishment Clause.'
In Mitchell v. Helms, 161 a plurality opinion written by Justice Thomas,
the Court upheld the constitutionality of a federally mandated Louisiana
program that lent educational materials and equipment to public and private
schools, both religious and nonreligious.1 62 Justice Thomas emphasized
that the "genuinely independent and private choice of individuals," as
opposed to the "unmeditated" will of government, determine what schools
ultimately benefit from the governmental aid and by how much. 163 "For if
numerous private choices, rather than the single choice of a government,
determine the distribution of aid pursuant to neutral eligibility criteria, then
a government cannot, or at least cannot easily, grant special favors that
64
might lead to a religious establishment."'
Finally, in Good News Club v. Milford Central School,165 the Court
held that limitation of a religious organization's ability to use the after
school facilities, which had been opened as a limited public forum to other
groups, constituted unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination.' 66
The
Court, in an opinion by Justice Thomas, stated that "neutrality is an
important reason for upholding government-aid programs against
Establishment Clause challenges." 167 Further, the "guarantee of neutrality
is respected, not offended, when the government, following neutral criteria

158. Id.
159.
See id. at 232.
160.
See id. at 226 (quoting Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Serv. for the Blind, 474 U.S.
481,487) (1986).

161.

530 U.S. 793 (2000).

162.

Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 811.

164.
165.
166.
167.

Id.
121 S. Ct. 2093 (2001).
Good News Club, 121 S. Ct. at 2100.
Id.at 2104 (quoting Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 838 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).

163.

Id.
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and evenhanded policies, extends benefits to recipients whose'1 68 ideologies
and viewpoints, including religious ones, are broad and diverse."
C. OTHER TESTS USED BY THE SUPREME COURT

In addition to the Lemon test, the Court has explored other factors that
might lead to violations of the Establishment Clause with varying degrees
of success. Such factors include coercion of citizens, endorsement of
religion, and direct/indirect benefit to religion. 169 For example, Justice
Kennedy developed a "coercion" test in Lee v. Weisman, a case involving a
nonsectarian prayer delivered by a rabbi before a public middle school
graduation ceremony. 70 Justice Kennedy recognized that "prayer exercises
in public schools carry a particular risk of indirect coercion,"'' because of
the "real conflict of conscience faced by a young student.' 72 The problem
with Justice Kennedy's psychological "coercion" theory is that it
"expand[s] the concept of coercion beyond acts backed by threat of penalty
173
Inventing a
- a brand of coercion that, happily, is readily discernible."'
psychological "coercion" test that is "boundless, and boundlessly
manipulable,"' 74 the "Court [goes] beyond the realm where judges know
what they are75 doing," and the result is, "not to put too fine a point on it,
incoherent."'
Justice O'Connor prefers to examine whether the government action is
seen as an official "endorsement" of religion "in terms of pubic
perception.,'176 The problem with this theory is that, taken to its logical
conclusion, the exceptions swallow the rule. For example, the designation
of Christmas as a federal holiday inherently gives a public perception of
government endorsement of Christianity. In addition, all civil services
undertaken by government could be considered as official endorsement of
Even the dating system used by Western
religious institutions.177

168.
Id. (quoting Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 839 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 843 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
169.
170.
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592 (1992).
171. Id. at 581-82.
172. Id. at 596.
Id. at 642 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
173.
Id. at 632.
174.
Id. at 636.
175.
176.
Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 842 (2000) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
177.
See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1946) (notingthat "statepaid policemen, detailed to protect children going to and from church schools from the very
real hazards of traffic," could be considered an endorsement of the religious schools because
police protection indirectly encourages students to attend such schools).
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civilization has sectarian religious origins. For instance, year 2000 on the
Western calendar is the 2000th year A.D., anno domini, Latin meaning
"year of our Lord."' 7 8 Years prior to A.D. are classified B.C.,
before
Christ. 7 9 Thus, even the dating system used by the Supreme Court to date
its decisions, and used by the Legislative and Executive branches of
government in exercise of their official duties, constitutes an official
"endorsement" of sectarian religion viewed in the broadest sense. These
weaknesses have prevented Justice O'Connor's "endorsement" theory of
the Establishment Clause from gaining wide following among the Justices.
The "direct/indirect" distinction, which prevented public money from
flowing directly to religious institutions, held favor with the Supreme Court

during the early Lemon test era.1 80 The Court used it as a means to protect
against the primary evil of government "sponsorship, financial support, and
active involvement of the sovereign on religious activity."'' 81 But prior to
this era, direct payments to religious schools were authorized under the
"G.I." Bill of 1944.182 These payments were made based on the free choice
of returning soldiers to attend sectarian schools. 18 3 In addition, later Lemon
test cases 84 have acknowledged government's neutrality toward religion
when private choice of individuals directs the payment. 185 As Justice
Thomas stated in Mitchell, the distinction between direct and indirect aid is
86
somewhat arbitrary. 1
Some justices would have the Establishment Clause trump the Free
87
Exercise Clause, but this ignores the plain reading of the Constitution.,
For instance Justice Souter dissenting in Mitchell v. Helms would read the

178.
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 23 (3d ed. 1993).
179.
Id. at 189.
180.
See supra Part III.A.
181.
Comm. for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 770
(1973) (quoting Walz and Lemon).
182.
38 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3706 (1994) (Originally enacted as Servicemen's
Readjustment Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 346, 58 Stat. 284, 289 (1944) ("The Administrator
shall pay to the educational or training institution... the customary cost of tuition ... .
183.
Id.
184.
See supra Part III.B.
185.
Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 816 (2000) (writing for the plurality, Justice
Thomas stated: "If aid to schools, even 'direct aid,' is neutrally available and, before
reaching or benefiting any religious school, first passes through the hands (literally or
figuratively) of numerous private citizens who are free to direct the aid elsewhere, the
government has not provided any 'support of religion."').
186.
Id. at 818 ("Whether one chooses to label this program, [lending government
owned educational materials and equipment to public and private schools,] "direct" or
"indirect" is a rather arbitrary choice, one that does not further constitutional analysis.").
187.
See id. at 867-68 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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Establishment Clause broadly at the expense of Free Exercise. "The First
Amendment's Establishment Clause ... has been held to prohibit not only
the institution of an official church, but any government act favoring
religion, a particular religion, or for that matter irreligion." 188 However,
Justice Souter overlooks the Free Exercise Clause immediately adjacent to
the Establishment Clause in the First Amendment, which constitutes an
express government act favoring religion.18 9
Conversely, Justice Thomas would swing the pendulum too far the
other way with his plurality opinion in Mitchell v. Helms.1 90 His rule, as
paraphrased by Justice O'Connor, is that: "[s]o long as the aid is offered on
a neutral basis and the aid is secular in content," there is no violation of the
Establishment Clause.' 91 Justice Thomas' rule is overbroad in scope
because it doesn't take into account the individual choice 92made by students
standing between the grantor (state) and grantee (church).1
193
For example, in Freedomfrom Religion Foundation,Inc. v. Bugher,
a direct grant program to subsidize telecommunications access for both
194
public and private schools was held to violate the Establishment Clause.
In Bugher, the Wisconsin legislature had authorized direct grants to all
The
schools to subsidize high-speed telecommunications access.1 95
Seventh Circuit, striking down the statute, reasoned:
[T]here are no real restrictions on the use of the grant
money by the religious schools; the money may be used as
easily for maintenance of the school chapel or for the
religious instruction classrooms or for connection time to
instead of payment for the
view a religious website,
196
telecommunications

188.
189.

links.

Id.
U.S. CONST. amend. I; see Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 98 (Rehnquist, J.,

dissenting) (quoting 1 ANNALS

OF CONG.,

730-31 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789); supra text

accompanying note 61.
See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 801-30 (2000).
190.
Id. at 837 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
191.
192.
Id. at 841 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that the Court decided "Witters
and Zobrest on the understanding that the aid was provided directly to the individual student
who, in turn, made the choice of where to put that aid to use.").
249 F.3d 606 (7th Cir. 2001).
193.
Id.at 614.
194.
Id. at 609.
195.
196. Id. at 613.
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This subsidy is completely neutral, such that it would be constitutional
by Justice Thomas' neutrality rule, because it is given to both public and
private schools, secular and sectarian, so long as they have contracts for
high-speed telecommunication links. As such, it is a state subsidy of
religious schools because no private choice of individuals directs such aid.
Rather, the aid is directed by the Wisconsin legislature. It should be held
unconstitutional because it supports religious institutions with tax money
while such institutions are exempted from paying taxes. Any other rule
would allow religious institutions to enjoy the benefits of public funds
without corresponding obligations.
D. ANALYSIS OF THE PROPER INTERPRETATION OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES

The proper interpretation reads the Establishment Clause and the Free
Exercise Clause as coequal 197 and searches for a middle path between the
two. 98 Chief Justice Rehnquist considered the context in which the
Establishment Clause was enacted and stated:
The Framers intended the Establishment Clause to prohibit
the designation of any church as a "national" one. The
Clause was also designed to stop the ... Government from
asserting a preference for one religious denomination or
sect over others . . . . As its history abundantly shows,
nothing in the Establishment Clause requires government
to be strictly neutral between religion and irreligion, nor
does that Clause prohibit Congress or the States from
pursuing
legitimate
secular
ends
through
nondescriminatory sectarian ends. 99
Under this analysis, adherents maintain their First Amendment right to
worship the "wall of separation" according to the dictates of their
conscience. But, such religion should not be established as a national
religion by the Court. To do so is contra legem to the Establishment
Clause. To summarize, the "altar/wall of separation" has been utilized by

197.
See Walz v Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970) (noting that "[t]he
Court has struggled to find a neutral course between the two Religion Clauses, both of
which are cast in absolute terms, and either of which, if expanded to a logical extreme,
would tend to clash with the other.").
198.
See id.
199.
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 113 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see supra text
accompanying notes 65-69.
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the Court in order to establish irreligion as a particular form of religion.
Since Congress was forbidden from passing law regarding the
establishment of religion, 2° the Court took it upon itself to do so. The
religion thus established could be called the "wall" religion. It is very
pliable, flexible and useful and like the test enunciated in Lemon, 20 1 no one
wishes to remove it completely.20 2
VI. CLEVELAND OHIO'S SCHOOL VOUCHER PROGRAM ON THE WALL

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND BEHIND CLEVELAND'S SCHOOL VOUCHER
PROGRAM

The recent developments of the Establishment Clause come into focus
through the lens of controversial programs that provide tuition vouchers to
students of failing public schools. 20 3 In particular, this comment focuses
upon the elementary school students attending public schools in Cleveland,
Ohio. 20 4 Due to mismanagement by the local school board, Cleveland's
public schools had been placed under state management and supervision by
order of the federal district court.2" 5 The Ohio Pilot Project Scholarship
Program was instituted to address the manifest failures of the public
The Scholarship Program ("voucher program" or "the
schools. 2°6
program") pays scholarships according to family income.20 7 The program
gives "preference to students from low-income families," defining them as

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
200.
See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-613 (1971); see supra text
201.
accompanying note 131.
Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398
202.
(1993) (Scalia, J., concurring). Scalia analogized the three part test enunciated in Lemon to
a:
ghoul in an a late night horror movie .... When we wish to strike down
a practice it forbids, we invoke it . . . ; when we wish to uphold a
practice it forbids, we ignore it entirely .... Such a docile and useful
monster is worth keeping around, at least in a somnolent state; one
never knows when one might need him.
Id.
See, e.g., Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 607-09 (Wis. 1998).
203.
Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 234 F.3d 945, 948 (6th Cir. 2000), cert. granted,70
204.
U.S.L.W. 3035 (U.S. Sept. 25, 2001) (No. 00-1751).
Id.
205.
See Simmons-Harris,234 F.3d at 963 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
206.
See id; see also Oio REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.978(A) (Anderson 1999).
207.
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those whose family income is less than 200% of the poverty line. 20 8 The
program requires participating private schools to cap tuition at $2500 per
student per year, and pays 90% of whatever tuition the school actually
charges for low-income families; the state pays 75% of tuition for other
families up to a maximum of $1875.209 Each scholarship is payable to the
parents of the student entitled to receive the scholarship. 21 Scholarship
checks are mailed to the school selected by the parents, where the parents
are required to endorse the checks over to the school in order to pay
tuition."'
Use of the scholarships is completely optional. For the 1999-2000
school year, 3761 students enrolled in the program; 60% of the enrollees
are from families at or below the poverty level. 2 ' Qualifying recipients
have four statutory alternatives to use the scholarships. 2 13 Qualifying
students may: (1) attend a nonreligious private school, (2) religious private
school, (3) public school in neighboring districts that wish to participate in
the voucher program, or (4) obtain special tutoring while remaining in the
Cleveland public schools. 21 4 However, no public schools in adjacent
districts have registered for the program since its inception because there is
a financial disincentive for public schools outside the district to take on
students via the school voucher program.2 15
B. SIXTH CIRCUIT'S REASONING BEHIND ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
VIOLATION

The constitutional deficiency inherent in the Cleveland voucher plan,
according to Judge Clay's majority opinion, is that the statute has "the

208.

CODE ANN.

209.
CODE ANN.
210.
CODE ANN.
211.
CODE ANN.
212.
213.
CODE ANN.
214.

Simmons-Harris, 234 F.3d at 963 (Ryan, J.,dissenting); see also OHIO REV.

§ 3313.978(A) (Anderson 1999).

Simmons-Harris, 234 F.3d at 963 (Ryan, J., dissenting); see also OHIO REV.

§§ 3313.976(A)(8), 3313.978(A) (Anderson 1999).

Simmons-Harris, 234 F.3d at 963 (Ryan, J., dissenting); see also OHIO REV.

§ 3313.979 (Anderson 1999).

Simmons-Harris, 234 F.3d at 963 (Ryan, J., dissenting); see also OHIO REV.

§ 3313.979(A)(1)(b)(2) (Anderson 1999).

Simmons-Harris, 234 F.3d at 949.
See Simmons-Harris, 234 F.3d at 968 (Ryan, J., dissenting); see also OHIO REV.
§§ 3313.976-978 (Anderson 1999).
See Simmons-Harris, 234 F.3d at 968 (Ryan, J., dissenting); see also OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 3313.976-978 (Anderson 1999).
215.
See Simmons-Harris, 234 F.3d at 959 (noting that "[p]er pupil expenditures in
the public schools are backed by $7,097 in public funding . .
At a maximum
[scholarship] of $2,250 there is a financial disincentive for public schools outside the district
to take on students via the school voucher program.").
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impermissible effect of benefitting only students in particular private, and
mostly religious, schools, irrespective of the illusory choice provided on

the face of the Ohio statute."'

6

No other schools can operate efficiently

enough to compete with the religious schools because "religious schools
often have lower overhead costs, supplemental income from private
217 However, the only
donations, and consequently lower tuition needs.,
authority offered for this proposition is a Fordham University Law Review
article.2 I8 Since the subsidized vouchers are insufficient in relation to the
actual cost of an education, the vast majority of students, close to 96%,
clearly has the
choose sectarian schools. 219 "Therefore, the program
2
0
schools."
sectarian
promoting
impermissible effect of
Clause and
Judge Clay reviewed the law relating
221to the Establishment
found "that Nyquist governs [the] result."
Factually, the program at hand is a tuition grant program
for low-income parents whose children attend private
school parallel to the tuition reimbursement program found
impermissible in Nyquist. Under both the New York
statute in Nyquist, as well as the Ohio Statute at issue,
parents receive government funds, either in direct payment
for private school tuition or as a reimbursement for the
same, and in both cases, the great majority of schools
benefitted by these tuition dollars are sectarian. The
Nyquist Court itself found there to be no distinction
between "a reimbursement, a reward, or a subsidy, [as in
all three,] the substantive impact is still the same." 222
The Nyquist Court wrote that providing direct financial assistance to
schools without any restrictions on the school's use of the funds
"advanc[ed] the religious mission of sectarian schools" thus having the

Id. at 962.
216.
Id. at 959 (citing Martha Minow, Reforming School Reform, 68 FORDHAM L.
217.
REv. 257, 262 (1999) (finding that voucher funding levels typically "approximate[ ] the

tuition level set by parochial schools [which] reflects subsidies from other sources")).
Simmons-Harris, 234 F.3d at 970 (Ryan, J., dissenting) (noting that "[t]his
218.
statement [regarding lower overhead costs and private donations] ... is totally without any
basis in the evidence, [but mere] ipse dixit.") (alteration in original).
219.

Simmons-Harris, 234 F.3d at 959.

221.

See id. at 958.

220.

Id.

222. Id. at 958-59 (quoting Comm. for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,
413 U.S. 756, 786 (1973)).
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"impermissible effect of advancing religion., 223 Judge Clay finds the Ohio
statute in Simmons-Harris factually parallel to the New York statute in
Nyquist and thus unconstitutional. 22 "We find such a scheme directly akin
to Nyquist's offensive aid to only private school students, and not an
instance where 'the class of beneficiaries included all schoolchildren, those
in public as well as those in private schools."' 225
C. JUDGE RYAN'S DISSENT

Judge Ryan, in his dissent, objected to the majority's reliance on
Nyquist for two reasons. First, the Simmons-Harris and Nyquist cases are
factually distinguishable; secondly, the Nyquist law has changed.226
Factually, the cases differ because in Nyquist, "[t]he New York legislature
enacted the statute for the sole purpose of directly benefitting New York
state's 2,038 financially pressed private schools, wherein some 700,000800,000 students--almost 20% of the state's entire elementary and
secondary school population--were being educated. 227 By contrast, the
purpose of the Ohio statute is to open the doors of educational opportunity
to poor children in failing public schools.228 The Ohio program includes
educational options for children, unlike the statute in Nyquist, including
after-school tutoring within the public schools.229 Judge Clay overlooked
these distinguishing characteristics in his majority opinion.
Furthermore, Nyquist was decided in an era of categorical prohibition
against direct grants to aid religious schools. 230 But, in Agostini v.
Felton,231 the Supreme Court declared unmistakably "we have departed
from the rule . . . that all government aid that directly assists the
educational function of religious schools is invalid., 232 First, the Nyquist
era categorical prohibition against direct grants to aid religious schools is
no longer the law; and second, the criteria for determining when a statute

223.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 794, 779-80.
224.
Simmons-Harris,234 F.3d at 958.
225.
Id. at 960 (quoting Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 782 n.38).
226.
Id. at 963 (Ryan J., dissenting).
227.
Id. at 964 (Ryan J., dissenting) (alteration in original); see also Nyquist, 413
U.S. at 768.
228.
See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3313.975(A) (Anderson 1999).
229.
See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3313.974-79 (Anderson 1999).
230.
Simmons-Harris,234 F.3d at 965 (Ryan J.,
dissenting).
231.
521 U.S. 203 (1997).
232.
Agostini, 521 U.S. at 225.
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has the forbidden "primary effect" of advancing religion have been
modified.233
Judge Ryan reviewed the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause
236
These
cases beginning with Mueller23 4 through Witters235 and Zobrest.
cases demonstrate the "principle ... that whether public funds find their
way to a religious school is of no constitutional consequence if they get
there as a result of genuinely private choice. 237 Judge Ryan then reviewed
Agostini,238 wherein the Court declared that its understanding of the criteria
for determining whether, in any specific program, govemment aid has the
primary effect of advancing religion had "changed.",239 The Agostini Court
concluded that programs in which money ultimately flows to a private,
religious school based on the "genuinely independent and private choices
24 °
of individuals" do not violate the Establishment Clause.
Judge Ryan concludes that the Ohio Pilot Project Scholarship program,
He focuses on the distinguishing
should have been upheld.24'
characteristics between the Nyquist and Simmons-Harris statutes as one
242 Moreover,
reason why the rule in Nyquist should not govern the result.
the Supreme Court's criteria under the impermissible effects prong of the
Lemon test have changed since Nyquist was decided. Therefore, the
Nyquist rule as applied by the majority, was inappropriate in this case.
D. ANALYSIS

In the Cleveland, "Ohio public school district, the "wall of separation"
has achieved its culmination as an "altar" to irreligion. The Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the freedom from establishment of religion

Id.; see supra Part III.B and text accompanying notes 154-60.
233.
Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 400 (1983); see supra Part III.B and text
234.
accompanying notes 145-48.
Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Serv. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 487 (1986); see
235.
supra Part III.B and text accompanying notes 150-51.
Zorbest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dis't, 509 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1993); see supra text
236.
accompanying notes 152-53.
Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 234 F.3d 945, 966 (6th Cir. 2000) (Ryan, J.,
237.
dissenting).
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
238.
Simmons-Harris, 234 F.3d at 966 (Ryan, J., dissenting) (quoting Agostini, 521
239.
U.S. at 223); see supra text accompanying notes 154-60.
Id. at 226, (quoting Witters, 474 U.S. at 487).
240.
Simmons-Harris, 234 F.3d at 963 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
241.
Id. at 963-64.
242.
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trumped the students' opportunity to receive an education. 3 The Supreme
Court has granted Ohio's petition for certiorari; thus, the Sixth Circuit's
decision may be overturned. 244 But if not overturned, this case stands as a
travesty to justice and the principles upon which the United States was
founded. Poor school children are prevented from obtaining a quality
education.
Instead, they are forced to figuratively prostrate themselves
upon the judicially created "wall of separation" between church and
state.246
In order to arrive at its conclusion, the Sixth Circuit applies the rule of
law developed in Nyquist that "direct aid in whatever form is invalid. 247
The problem with the court's reasoning is that "the law upon which Nyquist
was decided has changed., 248 In addition, the Lemon test for whether a
statute has the "primary effect" of advancing religion has been modified.24 9
Unfortunately, by doing so, the majority of the Court "sentenc[es] nearly
4,000 poverty-level, mostly minority, children in Cleveland to return to the
indisputably failed Cleveland public schools. 25°

243.
Id. ("The determinations of states and school boards [intended to remedy the
problem of failing schools and to rectify educational inequality] cannot infringe upon the
necessary separation between church and state.").
244.
Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 234 F.3d 945 (6th Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 70
U.S.L.W. 3035 (U.S. Sept. 25, 2001) (No. 00-1751).
245.
Andrew Goldstein, Setbackfor Vouchers, TIME, Dec. 25, 2000, at 142 (noting
that "[i]n Cleveland's public schools, only a third of students graduate, and last year the city
district - despite spending $8,502 a year on each of its 76,000 students - failed to meet even
one of the state's 27 performance standards.").
246.
See Simmons-Harris, 234 F.3d at 974 (Ryan, J., dissenting) (categorizing the
majority's decision as "an exercise in raw judicial power having no basis in the First
Amendment or in the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence").
247.
Id. at 953 (following Comm. for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,
413 U.S. 756, 780 (1973).
248.
Id. at 965 (Ryan, J., dissenting) (noting that "the Nyquist era categorical
prohibition against direct grants to aid religious schools is no longer the law.").
249.
Id.
250.
Id. at 974 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
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If not burdened by the trumped up Establishment Clause objections to
school vouchers, the public school education problem would be clearly
The problem with a
recognized for what it is, a deficient monopoly.2
than satisfying the
rather
itself
maintaining
on
monopoly is that it focuses
25 2 The education monopoly feeds the voracious
needs of its customer.
appetite of school bureaucrats and administrators first, while the customer
students pay high prices in tax dollars for inferior quality educational
only come from introducing competition into
goods. 253 "The remedy can
25 4
market.,
school
the public
Flexibility amongst the several states to experiment and test social
policy through the crucible of experience is important in the context of
monopoly industries. Justice Brandeis recognized as much when he said:
There must be power in the States and the Nation to
remould, [sic] through experimentation, our economic
practices and institutions to meet changing social and
economic needs .... Furthermore, [d]enial of the right to
experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to
the Nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal
system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country.

25 5

Disregarding this advice, the Sixth Circuit puts a constitutional
straightjacket on states with failing public schools. In doing so, the court
prevents educational experimentation that might otherwise discover more
effective teaching methods.256

More Money?, WALL ST. J., Dec. 20, 2000, at A22 ("The public school system
251.
is a monopoly. The government has conferred state monopoly status on public schools by
funding them with taxpayer money and apportioning them, one to an area, and then
directing a steady stream of students to them according to students' residential location.").
Id. ("A monopoly serves the monopoly first, not its customers.").
252.
Id. (stating that per pupil expenditures have more than tripled in real dollar
253.
terms during the past thirty years; yet, according to a research fellow at the Hoover
Institution, "[o]verall student performance has not improved, nor have U.S. students shown
any improvement in international achievement tests.").
Id.
254.
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
255.
dissenting).
Neal Devins, Social Meaning and School Vouchers, 42 WM. & MARY L. REv.
256.
919, 962 (2001) (acknowledging that the "stakes of the education reform debate are simply
too high for courts to engage in absolutist decision making").
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If the public school education market were any other, the introduction
of competition to improve education quality at lower cost would be more
obvious. For instance, the American automobile production market faced a
serious crisis during the 1970s brought about by the improved quality of
Japanese manufacturers. 57 During the twenty years from 1960 to the end
of the 1970s, "Japanese manufacturers ...surpassed their U.S. counterparts
in quality and productivity in an extremely short period of time., 258
Japanese workers were used to taking responsibility for improving a
factory's operations. They "used 'quality circles,' small discussion groups
in which workers offered suggestions for improving everything from
quality to productivity to safety."25 9 This created a crisis of competition for
U.S. manufacturers and instilled fears of imminent bankruptcy into their
hearts .2 6
For example, Chrysler Corporation required an emergency
infusion of capital in the form of a loan from the federal government in
26
order to remain solvent. 1
The solution was obvious. Businesses were forced to improve their
products and lower costs in order to remain competitive and survive in the
global environment. 262 But public schools do not face the same sort of
incentives to produce superior student performance. Instead, they have the
advantage of limited competition.26 3 Rather than improve their own
product, which would require cutting costs and improving efficiency, the
public school's recommended solution is more money to lower student64
teacher 265ratios.
contrast,
a competitive
market.
Private By
schools
"faceprivate
lethal schools
incentivesdo toface
produce
superior

257.
AKIRA KAWAHARA, THE ORIGIN OF COMPETITIVE STRENGTH, FIFTY YEARS OF
THE AUTO INDUSTRY IN JAPAN AND THE U.S. 92 (1998).
258.
259.

Id.

PAUL INGRASSIA & JOSEPH B. WHITE, COMEBACK: THE FALL AND RISE OF THE
AMERICAN AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY 329 (1994).

260.
Id. at 60 (noting a popular T-shirt that read: "Detroit. Where the Weak Are
Killed and Eaten").
261.
Id. at 61-62.
262.
Id. at 330 ("[Auto industry] executives... would come to watch what Honda
was doing. Often, they were amazed.").
263.
More Money?, WALL ST. J., Dec. 20, 2000, at A22, ("Most parents don't have
the money to send their kids to private schools--especially since they are already paying
taxes for public schools--so private schools cannot currently generate enough competition
for public schools.").
264.
Id.
265.
Id. ("If a private school does not deliver high-quality education relative to price,
parents will withdraw their children and their dollars in favor of one that does and the
offending school will find itself kaput.").
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student performance.,, 266 The good news is that the introduction of
by private schools improves public schools without raising
competition
2 67
CoStS.

Some cities are beginning to experiment with their school systems by
introducing business-style management, responsibility and accountability
after experiencing years of bureaucratic failure. For example, the City of
Chicago, Illinois took over the public school system in the 1990's after
experiencing years of decreasing or stagnant student test scores. Under
schools CEO Paul Vallas, a sense of responsibility was returned to the
school setting. 268 For several years before the city takeover, the schools
had demanded and received more and more money in order to better
educate the .children. Yet, as student results continued to decrease, the
schools demanded even more money. Finally, the City of Chicago took
control of the schools and instituted a program that eliminated "social
promotion. ' 269
Social promotion had effectively removed the incentive for students to
learn, because even if the students learned nothing, he or she would be
promoted to the next grade. 270 The schools eliminated "social promotion"
and students were held accountable for learning the material. Scores began
to climb and other cities now look to Chicago as a model of responsibility,
success and progress. 271 The students, by focusing on their responsibilities,
achieved the right to be promoted to the next grade. Thus the individual
"right" to promotion was properly realigned with the students'
"responsibility" to learn. Peer pressure became a force for achievement

Id. ("On the whole, private schools offer better education and superior student
266.
performance for less money than do public schools.").
Id. ("Competition 'significantly raises the quality of public schools, as
267.
measured by educational attainment, wages and high school graduation rates.' Plus ...
costs at public schools did not rise significantly . . . [b]ecause competition cuts out
bureaucratic infrastructure from schools.") (quoting Professor Caroline Hoxby at Harvard
University).
See Michael Martinez, When the Goals of Reform Collide Raising Standards
268.
May Have A High Price,CHI. TRIB., Oct. 22, 2000, § 2, at 1.
Id.
269.
Id.
270.
Mayor Richard M. Daley, Address to the Chinese American Benevolent
271.
Association (July 28, 1998). The Mayor said, "the first thing visiting dignitaries comment
on when they come to Chicago is not how beautiful the city is with its expansive parks,
interesting ethnic neighborhoods and wonderful Lake Michigan. The first thing they want
The Mayor replied, "by pushing
to know is, 'how did you improve your schools?'
responsibility from the top of the bureaucracy down to the individuals on the front line,
including students, parents, teachers and principals." Id.
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rather than a hindrance because students did not want to be left behind
when their friends moved on.
CONCLUSION

The proper balance between the religion clauses was advocated by
Justice Douglas in Zorach v. Clauson.272
However, the Court's
interpretations and modifications of the "wall of separation" should be
recognized for what they have become, a form of government sanctioned
religion. 273 We must return to a proper balance between the religion
clauses of the Constitution, and return hope to the public schoolchildren of
Cleveland, Ohio. The Supreme Court should overturn the Sixth Circuit in
Simmons-Harris in light of ongoing changes to Establishment Clause
jurisprudence. There is no need for the Court to treat religion as if it were
100 proof liquor, imbibed only upon attainment of the age of majority.2 74
Religion should not be hidden from the developing minds of young people;
rather, it should be freely and openly recognized for its important role
throughout the history and traditions of the United States.275

272.
343 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1952) ("When the state encourages religious instruction
or cooperates with religious authorities by adjusting the schedule of public events to
sectarian needs, it follows the best of our traditions. For it then respects the religious nature
of our people and accommodates the public service to their spiritual needs.").
273.
See Zorach, 343 U.S. at 314:
To hold that it may not would be to find in the Constitution a
requirement that the government show a callous indifference to religious
groups. That would be preferring those who believe in no religion over
those who do believe .... But we find no constitutional requirement
which makes it necessary for government to be hostile to religion and to
throw its weight against efforts to widen the effective scope of religious
influence.
Id.
274.
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 85 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). justice Berger
commented on the irony that Supreme Court sessions open with an invocation for divine
protection, and Congress opens its sessions with:
extended, thoughtful invocations and prayers for Divine guidance ....
Inevitably some wag is bound to say that the Court's holding today [that
a statutorily prescribed moment of silence for school children is an
unconstitutional establishment of religion] reflects a belief that the
historic practice of the Congress and this Court is justified because
members of the Judiciary and Congress are more in need of Divine
guidance than are schoolchildren.
Id.
275.
See supra Part II.A.

2001]

GOD, MAN, AND LA W

The "wall of separation" between church and state has expanded far
beyond the limits necessary to prevent establishment of a national religion.
School children should be allowed to learn the religious principles upon
which the United States was founded.276 In addition, non-sectarian
religious references and invocations should be accepted openly, even in
elementary schools because of their historic role in the United States,
which continues in public discourse even today. For example, Vice
President Al Gore, in his concession speech to Governor Bush, quoted
Stephen Douglas telling Abraham Lincoln, who had just defeated him for
the presidency: "Partisan feeling must yield to patriotism. I'm with you,
277
Mr. President, and God bless you."
Complete destruction and abolishment of the "wall of separation" is
not recommended. For, like other Supreme Court-crafted constitutional
requirements, it has become a part of our national culture. 27 8 However, this
"wall" should be recognized for what it is. "Whether due to its lack of
historical support or its practical unworkability, the . . 'wall' has proved
all but useless as a guide to sound constitutional adjudication.'2 79 It has
become merely an interesting metaphor that has taken on a life of its
own. 28 Renewed focus should be placed on individual responsibilities as
the foundation of our legal and other rights.
According to an American proverb, "an ounce of prevention is worth a
pound of cure.",28' Religion has a special place in the history of this great
country, 282 which ne
need not be obfuscated nor obscured through expansive
Supreme Court interpretations of the Establishment Clause. It forms part
of the basis of mankind's responsibility towards fellow members of society,
which results in the freedoms we have come to cherish. School instruction

276.
See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952). Justice Douglas stressed that
"[w]e are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being." Id.; see supra
Part II.A.
277.
Doyle McManus & Alan C. Miller, Decision 2000 - Lawyers Pushfor Final
Appeal, but Gore Passes Endgame, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2000, at Al.
278.
Cf Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000) (describing Miranda
prophylactic warnings, read to prisoners prior to police questioning: "Mirandahas become
embedded in routine police practice to the point where the warnings have become part of
our national culture.").
279.
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 107 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
280.
See id.; see also Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926)
(illustrating only too well the wisdom of Justice Cardozo's observation that "[m]etaphors in
law are to be narrowly watched, for starting as devices to liberate thought, they end often by
enslaving it.").
281.
A DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN PROVERBS 482-83, (1992). Variation: "Prevention
is better than cure." Id.
282.
See supra Part II.A.
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should address the origins of our cherished freedoms as rooted in individual
Lest through neglected foundations the fruits of our
responsibility.
democracy be lost.
E. THOMAS RYDER

